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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A BEACON FOR REFORM OF INVESTORSTATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Daniel Gervais*

I. Introduction
This Article attempts to resolve clashes between intellectual property
and investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”). ISDS clauses contained in
bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral trade and investment agreements give
multinational investors (corporations) a right to sue a state in a binding
1
proceeding before an independent arbitral tribunal. This jurisgenerative
right to file a claim against a state in an international tribunal with
mandatory jurisdiction is exceptional; it is generally reserved to other
2
states. Only multinational corporations can use ISDS to file claims against
states in which they invest, provided the state is party to a bilateral
investment treaty (“BIT”) or a trade agreement containing an investment
3
chapter (“International Investment Agreement” or “IIA”). The ISDS case
filed by the global pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly against Canada based
*
Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law, Vanderbilt University Law School and
Director of the Vanderbilt Intellectual Property Program. President, International Association
for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (“ATRIP”). The
Author thanks Dan Burk, Susy Frankel, Christophe Geiger, Molly Land, Tim Meyer, Svetlana
Yakovleva and Peter Yu, for their useful comments on the initial draft or for agreeing to
discuss the ideas developed in this Article. The Author also wishes to thank the editorial team
at the Journal for their excellent work on the manuscript. All errors and opinions expressed
should be attributed to the Author and not to any other person or organization.
1.
See Fact Sheet: Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP.,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-statedispute-settlement-isds (last visited Jul. 25, 2018) [hereinafter USTR Fact Sheet]. The main
remedy available to investors is the payment of compensation, as investor-state dispute
settlement (“ISDS”) tribunals cannot order a government to change a measure even if it found
to have affected the rights of an investor. See id. The possibility of paying additional
compensation in the future to the complainant (assuming the impact on the investment
continues) or to other investors similarly affected, however, may lead a country to change the
impugned measure. See Adam H. Bradlow, Human Rights Impact Litigation in ISDS: A
Proposal for Enabling Private Parties to Bring Human Rights Claims Through Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 43 YALE J. INTL. L. 355, 388 (2018) (explaining how the
threat of ISDS can be sued to change human rights norms).
2.
See José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (2011).
3.
See id. at 31; see also Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced
Approach to Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 483, 489–90 (2001);
David R. Sedlak, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the
Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 147, 147–49 (2004).
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on the invalidation by a Canadian court of two patents was the first direct
4
major clash between IP and ISDS.
The case added a layer to the already highly controversial nature of
ISDS. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-winning economist and major critic of
ISDS, noted in a letter to Congress that ISDS protected foreign property
more than domestic property and that prior experience with ISDS suggested
that ISDS locked in “regulatory boundaries, by subjecting any changes to
laws or rules by Federal, state or local government to challenge by foreign
5
investors.” Moreover, ISDS proceedings cost millions of dollars. In the
Philip Morris case (discussed later), Uruguay might have had to settle had it
not been for the reported financial support it received from Michael
6
Bloomberg. Along similar lines, a group of more than 200 law professors
asked that no trade deal containing ISDS provisions be signed by the United
States, noting that ISDS gives foreign corporations the ability to bypass the
“robust, nuanced, and democratically responsive” U.S. legal framework;
circumvent local, state, or federal domestic administrative bodies and
7
courts; and “re-litigate cases they have already lost in domestic courts.”
This is no small issue: according to the United Nations, as of 2016, there are
3,304 IIAs in existence around the world (2,946 BITs and 358 other treaties
8
with investment provisions), and they cover almost all countries.
The traditional justification for ISDS is that it provides a remedy for
uncompensated or improperly compensated expropriations of private assets
9
owned by, or for the unfair or inequitable treatment of, foreign investors. In
recent years, however, ISDS has moved well past traditional, or direct,
expropriation—that is, transfer of property rights to the state. Two core

4.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, (March 16,
2017),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=UNCT/14/2
[hereinafter The Canada Award].
5.
Letter from Joseph E. Stiglitz to U.S. Cong. (May 18, 2015),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/265770405/Letter-to-Congress-Stiglitz-on-Trade-Deal.
6.
See James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and
Enforcement from the WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 427, 436 (2017) (noting “Uruguay would have had to settle the case with Philip Morris
had billionaire philanthropist Michael Bloomberg not volunteered to fund the costs of ICSID
litigation.”). The average cost, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), is $8 million but can reach $30 million. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn
Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy
Community, 19
(OECD,
Working
Papers
on
Int’l
Inv.
No.
2012/03),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en.
7.
Laurence H. Tribe et al., 220+ Law and Economics Professors Urge Congress to
Reject the TPP and Other Prospective Deals that Include Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS), PUB. CITIZEN (Sept. 7, 2016), www.citizen.org/documents/isds-law-economicsprofessors-letter-Sept-2016.pdf.
8.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2016:
Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2016, at 101 (June 22,
2016) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report].
9.
See USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
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norms of ISDS—indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment
(“FET”)—have been pushed by investors in ISDS proceedings in new areas
of law and policy. Investors routinely use claims of indirect expropriation to
challenge regulatory measures that do not effectuate a direct expropriation
10
but rather “effectively neutralize” the enjoyment of the property. Investors
have also made abundant use of the FET standard, a most controversial
11
issue in ISDS scholarship. In the context of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (the “NAFTA”), an interpretive note issued by the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission tried to stem this tide by stating that the
FET standard does not require “treatment in addition to or beyond that
which is required by the customary international law minimum standard
12
treatment of aliens.”
Eli Lilly v. Canada is a case about two pharmaceutical patents that were
invalidated by Canadian courts for lack of utility. The tribunal in this case
13
used both indirect expropriation and the FET standard. The case is a prime
example of ISDS’s notable recent incursion in the field of intellectual
property (“IP”), an incursion that is said to have caused a “regulatory
chill”—namely, the risk that a regulatory change might trigger liability if it
increases the costs or decreases the profits of a foreign investor, as the
14
invalidation of a patent might by preventing capture of the patent rent. No

10.
Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, ¶ 200 (Sept. 3, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 66
(2006).
11.
See GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
182–83 (2015).
12.
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Note of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions
(July
31,
2001),
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/commission/ch11understanding_e.asp; see also North
American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 ILM 289
(1993). On the FTC, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade
Commission and the Rule of Law, in FIFTEEN YEARS OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 ARBITRATION
175 (Frédéric Bachand & Emmanuel Gaillard eds., 2011).
13.
The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 181; see also Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 12,
at 181.
14.
See Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, The Incredible Shrinking Victory: Eli Lilly
v. Canada, Success, Judicial Reversal, and Continuing Threats from Pharmaceutical ISDS, 49
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 505 (2017) (“The risks of regulatory chill are of course exacerbated by
general IP-maximalist pressures from the United States, the European Union, Japan,
Switzerland, and other pro-pharma countries, and by extra-arbitral pressures relating to
specific ISDS claims, such as those described previously concerning the Eli Lilly v.
Canada arbitration.”); Plamen Dinev, Regulatory Chill and the TTIP: An Intellectual Property
Perspective, 39 EUR. INT. PROP. REV. 344, 345 (2017) (noting that “[p]erhaps the most
fiercely criticised aspect of the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP is the possibility of regulatory
chill.”); Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM.
U. L. REV. 829, 859 (2017) (“Regulatory chill, while difficult to prove, is particularly
problematic in the intellectual property field . . . .”). Patent rents are the difference between
marginal costs and the sales price made possible by the patent right. Patent rents are typically
used to cover new research and development, but in the case of pharmaceutical companies go
mostly toward profits and advertising. Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision:
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industry is more dependent on patent protection than pharmaceuticals:
products are enormously costly to develop and test, but once a new drug is
on the market, it can be copied at a very low cost, meaning that the (usually
only) way to recoup investments and turn a profit is the market exclusivity
15
provided by a patent. Yet pharmaceuticals differ from other consumeroriented goods, in part because consumers often rely on doctors—who may
be influenced by pharmaceutical marketing—and in part because the
product is often paid for by public authorities. This causes a tension
between a policy of fostering pharmaceutical innovation, on the one hand,
16
and using the public purse responsibly, on the other. Baker and Geddes
argue that, in this context, the enormous profits that patents can help
generate “give perverse incentives to right-holders to advance spurious and
marginal claims . . . The growing number of ISDS cases based on IP claims
17
is troubling indeed, as is their in terrorem effect.”
A second ISDS complaint, filed by Philip Morris against Uruguay
under the Swiss-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”), directly
challenged IP (trademark) measures taken by Uruguay. The complainant
18
described these measures as indirect expropriation and a FET violation.
Because tobacco control is seen by many as a crucial public health measure,
the case was seen as a frontal challenge to Uruguay’s regulatory
19
sovereignty.
IP is a particularly interesting field of study in the ISDS context for at
least three reasons. First, IP sits at the intersection of private property rights
and public policy objectives of innovation and economic and human

World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317,
325 (2005).
15.
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 88–89 (2008).
16.
See Michelle C. Perez, Trading Goods for Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined by
Investor State Dispute Mechanisms?, 49 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 132, 166 (2018) (“The
general consensus was that not only was this a great victory for Uruguay and the concept of
national sovereignty”); Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to
Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 218–19 (2015).
Canada has a publicly-funded healthcare system that covers most of the cost of many
pharmaceutical products. See, e.g., Ontario Public Drug Program –Public Information, ONT.
MINISTRY HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/public/
programs/drugs/ (“[I]f you qualify, Ontario’s drug programs will pay most of the cost of some
of your prescription drugs.”).
17.
Baker & Geddes, supra note 14, at 513.
18.
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 193, 313 (July 8, 2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/
casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/10/7 [hereinafter The Uruguay Award].
19.
See Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113
AM. J. INTL. L. 1, 15 (2019) (“The objection is that ISDS has tended to strike a balance
weighted too heavily in favor of investor property, at the expense of host
state regulatory autonomy. . . .”).
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20

development. This Article examines whether and how ISDS tribunals
adjudicating claims by investors that their (private) IP rights were unduly
affected by state action can and should reach beyond the text of the
applicable IIA and into the public policy realm. Putting the spotlight on the
ISDS/IP interface illuminates similar impacts of ISDS on the state’s ability
to intervene in key policy areas.
Second, IP law by nature crosses lines that separate legal disciplines. In
the field of ISDS, in which investors are pushing for protection of private
rights, IP also reflects public policy choices, on the one hand, and now also
21
human rights. In the context of both Eli Lilly v. Canada (concerning
pharmaceutical patents) and Philip Morris v. Uruguay (concerning tobacco
22
control), the right to health in particular comes to mind. The following
Venn diagram shows that there will be cases in which all three domains (IP,
human rights, and investor protection) intersect. The award in the Uruguay
case discussed below provides a good example of a triple intersection.

20.
See id. at 3. Domestically, public law is the law of relations between the state and
the citizen, which IP does to a point (as with applications to register rights or criminal
enforcement of IP rights), and private law is the law of relations between citizens (such as
property—of which IP has at least some of the contours—torts and contracts). See Hanoch
Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1401–06 (2016)
(discussing Nozick’s, Rawls’, Dworkin’s and Kant’s views on the public law/private law
distinction). Public law reflects public policy choices, such as for the provision of public
health services. The distinction is useful though it may not always be clear and coherent. See
id. at 1406–09.
21.
Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. J. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (“[H]uman rights law is
intellectual property’s new frontier.”).
22.
This article uses the term “human rights,” but the same reasoning could apply to
internationally-recognized social rights. For a discussion of the overlaps and distinctions
between the two notions, see Robert Wai, Countering, Branding, Dealing: Using Economic
and Social Rights In and Around the International Trade Regime, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 35, 70–
71 (2003).
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Third, and finally, newer IIAs provide sector-specific public interest
carve-outs that aim to put certain regulatory matters beyond the reach of
ISDS tribunals. For example, recent IIAs signed by the European Union (the
23
“EU”) exclude environmental protection measures from ISDS review.
Then, as the Eli Lilly v. Canada case was proceeding, Canadian and EU
negotiators made a last minute change to the text of the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (the “CETA”) by adding a declaration that
effectively excludes most IP measures from the jurisdiction of ISDS
24
tribunals. Such exclusions pose an interpretative challenge: should policy
areas not so named a contrario remain subject to closer scrutiny (for
23.
See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., arts. 22.1, 23.2,
24.3, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA]; Free Trade Agreement Between
the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, E.U.-Sing., art. 13.1(a),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961/ (not yet signed) (last updated Apr.
18, 2018); Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Union and Its
Member States, on the One Hand, and Central America on the Other arts. 286, ¶¶ 1–2, 287,
June 29, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 346) 1; Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its
Member States, of the One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, Colom.-E.U.-Peru,
arts. 269, ¶ 3, 270, ¶ 2, June 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 354) 1; Free Trade Agreement Between
the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the
Other Part, E.U.-S. Kor., arts. 13.4, 13.5, Oct. 6, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 1.
24.
The tribunal in Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2)
was constituted in April 2014. Case Details: Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case
No. UNCT/14/2), INT’L CTR. FOR INV’R-STATE DISPUTES, WORLD BANK GRP.,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=UNCT/14/2 (last visited
Jan. 7, 2019). The CETA declaration was agreed upon in August 2014. See Michael Geist,
Did Canada Cave on the Pharmaceutical Patent ISDS Issue in CETA?: Still No Text, But
Official Comments Suggests It Did, MICHAEL GEIST (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2014/08/canada-cave-pharmaceutical-patent-isds-issue-ceta-stilltext-report-suggests/; Gus Van Harten, A Report On The Flawed Proposals For Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) In TTIP And CETA 7(Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 16, 2015).
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example, the vast majority of IIAs that, unlike CETA, do not carve out IP)
25
and, if so, according to which test or standard?
The topic is also timely. ISDS, which emerged in earnest in 1993 in the
NAFTA, is also contained in the more recent Dominican Republic-Central
26
America FTA (the “CAFTA-DR”). In fact, ISDS clauses now apply to
almost all bilateral trade relations, though they are being negotiated as part
27
of major trade deals where they may undergo significant changes. ISDS
will likely form part of the possible new trade deal between the world’s two
largest trading partners (the European Union and the United Sates), known
as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (the “TTIP”)—should
it come into being—as the United States insists on having the clause, and
the EU’s current position in international trade talks is to reform, not
28
exclude, ISDS. The EU has proposed creating a permanent ISDS court “in
order to develop a coherent, unified and effective policy on investment
29
dispute resolution.” The Transpacific Partnership (the “TPP”) Agreement
also contains ISDS provisions, and such provisions are likely to be included

25.
See infra notes 144 and 183 and accompanying text.
26.
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug.
5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. The ISDS provisions are in
Chapter 10. See Vivian H.W. Wang, Investor Protection or Environmental Protection?
“Green” Development Under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 260–61 (2007).
27.
Under the “new NAFTA,” the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), ISDS
provisions were removed between Canada and the United States, though U.S. investors still
have three years to use NAFTA’s ISDS system. See Jack Caporal & William Alan Reinsch,
From NAFTA to USMCA: What’s New and What’s Next?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC INT’L STUD.
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/nafta-usmca-whats-new-and-whats-next.
28.
ISDS has been one of the stumbling blocks in the more recent TTIP negotiations
due to EU demands to improve the mechanism by creating a permanent investment court, an
option discussed further in Part V, infra. See Luis Miguel Velarde Saffer & Amir Ardelan
Farhadi, Lessons from the Deathbed of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Are Recent
Critiques of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) System Warranted?, 11 DISP.
RESOL. INT’L 3, 5 (2017) (“Criticisms of the [ISDS] system are not new, and have been
stumbling blocks in the negotiation of other investment treaties, such as the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Nevertheless, the solution should not be to abandon
the system, but rather to improve it. This has been the case in the context of the TTIP
negotiations, where the European Commission proposed the creation of the so-called
investment court to address, among others, concerns regarding arbitrators’ impartiality and the
system’s transparency.”). Saffer and Farhadi discussion emphasizes the contrast between
private rights in goods the use of which in almost all cases is decided by private actors, and
goods in which public policy choices are embedded (often but not necessarily a public good).
A number of IP rights have both aspects. The owner of a patent can decide how to exploit (or
not) that patent. But the usage of patents related to materials significantly affected by public
policy (pharmaceuticals, certain classes of weapons etc.) will be directly regulated or, as is the
case with the patents and trademarks at play in the two cases discussed in the Article, will at
least intersect with public policy concerns. See generally id.
29.
Questionnaire on Options for a Multilateral Reform of Investment Dispute
Resolution, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?
consul_id=233 (last updated Jan. 7, 2018).
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30

in most future BITs. This Article suggests ways in which both future trade
agreements and any permanent forum established to hear ISDS cases can
better integrate vital public policy concerns by using intellectual property as
a beacon for reform.
Against this backdrop of expansion and critiques of overreach, many
countries are sticking with ISDS but simultaneously trying to reform it to
limit its reach in policy areas where they wish to preserve regulatory
31
autonomy. For example, India carved out an exception for intellectual
property compulsory licensing in its most recent model BIT, precluding
32
such disputes from ISDS. Stated differently, with over 3,000 IIAs in
existence and more to follow, ISDS is here to stay, but a reform of its scope
33
and mode of application is afoot.
As more and more carve-out clauses emerge, what is the situation for
IIAs that contain no such carve-outs? Can states avoid paying compensation
ordered by an ISDS tribunal for public policy measures that affect private IP
rights without such exclusions? As will be apparent from the Article’s
accounts of two major recent ISDS cases, the respondent states justified in
different ways the compatibility of the IIAs containing the applicable ISDS
clauses (NAFTA and the Swiss-Uruguay BIT) with the IP measures

30.
For information on the TPP, see Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP. (Oct. 4, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership;
Trans
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans
Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) - Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam: Background and
Negotiations, ORG. AM. STATES FOREIGN TRADE INFO. SYS., http://www.sice.oas.org/
TPD/TPP/TPP_e.ASP (last visited Jan. 7, 2018). For a discussion about the inclusion of ISDS
provisions in BITs, see Nikesh Patel, Note, An Emerging Trend in International Trade: A
Shift to Safeguard Against ISDS Abuses and Protect Host-State Sovereignty, 26 MINN. J.
INTL. L. 273 (2017) (reviewing bilateral and plurilateral agreements and model BITs
containing ISDS provisions in several parts of the world, in both developing and merging
economies).
31.
See Patel, supra note 30, at 302 (“As recent global trade policies and agreements
suggest, changes to ISDS signal an emerging shift towards further safeguards against ISDS
abuses and greater protections for host state sovereignty.”); Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer,
Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J.
INT’L L. 361, 408 (2018) (arguing that States need flexibility in their approach to ISDS and
noting that “[c]ontexts differ across states, and choices should depend on those contexts.”).
32.
See Sonia E. Rolland & David M. Trubek, Legal Innovation in Investment Law:
Rhetoric and Practice in Emerging Countries, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 355, 397 (2017) (“Article
2.4 [of the 2016 model BIT] carves out from the treaty local government measures, which is a
vast exclusion for a federal state like India, any measure related to taxation and a number of
other issues such as compulsory licenses of intellectual property rights . . . .”).
33.
See Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, And Paradigmatic Reform of InvestorState Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410, 410 (2018) (“[M]any states view investor-state
arbitration as akin to a horse that has bolted from the barn. Wishing to close the stable door, a
wide range of states are considering the merits of various reform proposals.”).
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34

challenged by Eli Lilly and Philip Morris, respectively. Canada argued that
the invalidation by a court of two pharmaceutical patents could not be
reviewed in an ISDS proceeding and that such invalidation amounted
neither to indirect exportation nor to unfair or inequitable treatment.
35
Canada, in other words, played the game within strict ISDS boundaries.
Uruguay took a different approach to defend itself against Philip Morris’
claim that its plain packaging legislation was expropriatory and constituted
a violation of FET. Beyond traditional ISDS arguments, it invoked human
36
rights to justify limits on the use of trademarks on cigarette packs.
The Article proceeds as follows. First, it presents the Eli Lilly v.
Canada dispute in Part II. The Article then turns to Philip Morris v.
Uruguay in Part III. In Part IV, the Article compares and contrasts the two
awards. Using lessons from this comparative analysis in Part V, the Article
examines a number of existing and possible new doctrinal mechanisms that
could be used to resolve IP/ISDS clashes and considers the role that human
rights might play in this context.

II. Eli Lilly v. Canada
A. Overview of the Dispute
Eli Lilly v. Canada drew considerable attention, both in Canada and
37
around the world. This Part provides a brief overview of the case and
considers the Tribunal’s findings that are most relevant to the IP/ISDS
38
interface.
Eli Lilly, the claimant, is a pharmaceutical company headquartered in
the United States and distributing throughout the globe. The dispute
stemmed from the invalidation of two patents on Lilly’s drugs Zyprexa and
Strattera (atomoxetine and olanzapine, respectively) by Canadian courts for

34.
See NAFTA, supra note 12; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Switz.-Uru., art. 10, Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 389.
35.
See infra Part II.A.
36.
See infra Part III.A.
37.
See, e.g., Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: InvestorState Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines – Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2015); Sean Flynn, Section III: Issues
Concerning Enforcement and Dispute Resolution, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 353 (2017); Gathii
& Ho, supra note 6; Ho, supra note 16; Valentina S. Vadi, Towards A New Dialectics:
Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health and Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 113 (2015).
38.
For a comprehensive picture of the case, see case documents (including party
briefs) available at Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2),
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/
pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?caseno=unct/14/2 (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
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failure to meet one of the core patentability criteria: utility. The case was
heard at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the
“ICSID”) in Washington, D.C.—a forum of choice for investor-state
disputes—under the United Nations Commission on International Trade
40
Law (the “UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules.
41
ICSID is known for the discreetness and effectiveness of its services.
Under the UNCITRAL Rules, an ad hoc tribunal, usually composed of three
42
experts, is established to hear each case. Although ICSID hearings
typically are not public—and calls for more transparency have been made—
the “memorials” (briefs) filed by the parties and expert reports, as well as
tribunal orders, are generally made available to the public on the ICSID
43
website.
Eli Lilly used the notion of indirect expropriation to challenge the
judicial application of patent law to specific inventions. In a nutshell, Lilly
argued that it “relied on Canada’s patent law when it sought patent
protection for Zyprexa and Strattera and launched those drugs in Canada”
and that the patents were issued “after a careful review by Canada’s patent
44
examiners in light of Canada’s utility” doctrine. Because new
interpretations by courts of patentability criteria normally apply to existing
45
patents as well as future ones, any significant change tightening the
interpretation of a patentability criterion could, in Lilly’s view, amount to
expropriation of its intellectual property. This argument amounted to a
challenge by a private, non-state actor to Canada’s sovereign ability to
regulate and evolve its patent law through court interpretations. It is
important to bear in mind in this context that patent invalidity is a common
defense to a patent infringement lawsuit, and a significant number of patents
39.
Utility is one of the basic patentability criteria in US and Canadian patent law. The
Canada Award, supra note 4, Claimant’s Memorial, ¶ 4 (Sept. 29, 2014). In countries other
than the United States and Canada, a standard known as industrial applicability is an
approximate equivalent of the utility criterion. See Convention on the Grant of European
Patents art. 52, ¶ 1, Nov. 29, 2000, 2001 O.J. EUR. PAT. OFF. SPEC. ED. NO. 4, at 54, 77.
40.
NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1120 (parties may submit claims under ICSID
Convention or UNCITRAL Arbitration rules).For the text of UNCITRAL, see U.N. Comm’n
on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Its Forty-Sixth Session, annexes I, II, U.N. Doc. A/69/17 (2014).
For a discussion of how UNCITRAL has struggled to update its rules due to divergences of
views among States, see Roberts, supra note 33.
41.
See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign
Investment: The Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 97, 103 (1986).
42.
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, supra note 21, art. 7.
43.
See J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State
Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681,
706 (2007).
44.
The Canada Award, supra note 4, Claimant’s Memorial, ¶ 20.
45.
E.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (examining the validity of two software patents issued in 2001 and 2003 based on the
new interpretation of patent eligibility in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014)).
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challenged in courts are invalidated in whole or in part when EU, Japanese,
46
and United States cases are aggregated.
Eli Lilly also argued that the interpretation of patentability criteria by
Canadian courts violated Canada’s obligations to afford “fair and equitable
47
treatment” to Lilly’s investments under NAFTA. Specifically, Eli Lilly
alleged that the court decisions violated: (i) protection against arbitrary
treatment because Canada’s patent law is completely unpredictable and
unreasonably difficult to satisfy; (ii) protection of legitimate, investment48
backed expectations; and (iii) protection against discriminatory treatment.

B. The Award
49

The Tribunal released the Award in March 2017. Though the Tribunal
rejected all of Eli Lilly’s substantive claims on the merits, the case remains
relevant for IP policy in part because the Tribunal had no difficulty
accepting that patents were protected investments as opposed to the
research necessary to generate the invention protected by the patent, which
50
may have been invested in another country. Stated differently, a protected
investment can be limited, it seems, to prosecution of the patent application
51
in a country where no research has taken place.
The applicable rules of interpretation in this case included the text of
52
the IIA at issue—NAFTA —and “applicable rules of international law[,]”
53
which NAFTA specifically mentions. According to the Award, those
applicable rules are articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (the “VCLT”), as well as “other applicable rules of international
54
law that may be relevant to the case before it.” This comes as no surprise;
46.
For 2015 data, see Douglas R. Nemec & Scott M. Flanz, After Period of High
Invalidation Rates, New US Patent Challenge Procedures May Slow Down to Moderate Pace
(April 26, 2016), SKADDEN, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/04/afterperiod-of-high-invalidation-rates-new-us-pat. In a 2015 case before the Supreme Court, the
debate was whether the defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is a defense. The court found
that it was not. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015).
47.
The Canada Award, supra note 4, Claimant’s Memorial ¶ 18.
48.
Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
49.
See The Canada Award, supra note 4.
50.
See id. ¶¶ 167, 469 (referring to the Zyprexa and Strattera Patents as “the
investments at issue in this arbitration”) The TRIPS Agreement prohibits discrimination as to
the place of invention. Cf. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
51.
A second, separate investment might be the subsequent commercialization of the
product protected by the patent.
52.
The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 4
53.
NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 102, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
54.
The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 106. See generally Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 31 ¶ 3(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (requiring a treaty to be
interpreted in light of the parties’ subsequent agreements) [hereinafter VCLT].
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it is generally well-accepted that the VCLT articles on treaty interpretation
55
reflect customary international law. ISDS tribunals often apply them even
56
where the applicable IIA is silent on applicable rules. Indeed, a detailed
review of 229 ISDS awards revealed that 132—approximately sixty
57
percent—of those cited the VCLT.
On the merits, the tribunal concluded that only egregious errors by a
domestic court could be subject to an ISDS claim absent a due process or
58
equivalent procedural fault. “Egregiousness” is a known standard in
59
determining the existence of a breach of customary international law. In
adopting that standard, the Tribunal refused to categorically exclude review
by ISDS tribunals of patent invalidations by domestic courts, but it set the
bar for complainants very high, noting that this review could only happen
“in very exceptional circumstances, in which there is clear evidence of
60
egregious and shocking conduct.” The Tribunal accepted “the analysis and
conclusions of the NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal in Glamis Gold v.
United States on the content of the customary international law minimum
61
standard of treatment.” In Glamis Gold, the tribunal defined the standard
as “an act that is sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of
justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due
process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall
62
below accepted international standard.” Bad faith, though not a formal
requirement, is often present in such cases, which adds a crucial dimension:
it seems self-evident that neither Eli Lilly nor Phillip Morris could establish
63
bad faith as the motivation for the measures they were attacking.

55.
See LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶ 99 (June 27);
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 53, ¶ 48 (Nov. 12).
56.
See, e.g., Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Decision on Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 56–57 (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C247/DC1030_En.pdf.
57.
TRINH HAI YEN, THE INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 38 (2014).
58.
See The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 224.
59.
See, e.g., id.; Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 620, 627 (June 8,
2009), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf; International Thunderbird
Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States, Award, ¶ 194 (Jan. 26, 2006),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_award.pdf.
60.
See The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 224. The Tribunal also quotes from Glamis
Gold, Ltd. v. United States that violating the customary international law minimum standard
of treatment requires “a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a
complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons.” Id. ¶ 222
61.
The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 222.
62.
Glamis Gold, ¶ 627; see also The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 224.
63.
Glamis Gold, ¶ 22 (“[A]lthough bad faith may often be present in such a
determination and its presence will certainly be determinative of a violation, a finding of bad
faith is not a requirement for a breach . . . .”)
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Though courts are organs of the state, the Tribunal also agreed with
64
Canada that ISDS tribunals are not courts of appeal for domestic courts.
Thus, the Tribunal accepted Canada’s claim that its courts’ interpretation of
patentability criteria effectuated a valid exercise of discretion in the
application of public policy objectives. As the Tribunal explained, the
appropriate test was the existence of a “rational connection” between the
65
policy objective and the measure.
The Award referenced several earlier arbitral awards to justify its
conclusions, as could be expected since a broad quantitative survey of ISDS
awards shows that ISDS tribunals “tend to follow an approach based in a
common law, rather than a civil law, tradition when addressing interpretive
66
issues.”
Before turning to Philip Morris, it is important to note that neither
human rights nor broader principles of international law beyond the ones
sparingly used to interpret the treaty—such as the VCLT—played a
significant role in the Award. This absence may be due to the fact that
Canada did not invoke human rights or fundamental rights in its counter67
memorial, nor in its Rejoinder on the Merits. As we shall now see, matters
took on a very different hue in the second case.

III. Philip Morris v. Uruguay
A. Overview of the Dispute
Philip Morris v. Uruguay, also heard at ICSID, was based on a 1988
68
Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. Philip Morris, the global company known
mostly for its sale of tobacco products, and its local affiliate in Uruguay
challenged two public health measures adopted by Uruguay to reduce
smoking, especially among young smokers. The challenged measures
included a “single presentation” requirement that prohibited different
69
packaging or “variants” for cigarettes sold under a given brand. For
64.
The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 221.
65.
Id. ¶ 423.
66.
Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An Empirical
Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 357 (2008).
67.
See The Canada Award, supra note 4, Counter –Memorial (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4131.pdf;
The
Canada
Award, supra note 4, Rejoinder Memorial (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ITA%20LAW%207014.pdf.
68.
Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra note
34.
69.
The “Single Presentation Requirement was implemented through Ordinance 514
dated 18 August 2008 (‘Ordinance 514’) of the Uruguayan Ministry of Public Health (the
‘MPH’). Article 3 of Ordinance 514 requires each cigarette brand to have a “single
presentation” and prohibits different packaging or ‘variants’ for cigarettes sold under a given
brand.” The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶ 10.
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example, Philip Morris could no longer sell Marlboro Red, Marlboro Gold,
Marlboro Blue, and Marlboro Green (Fresh Mint); it had to pick one and
only one, and it picked Marlboro Red and its licensee in Uruguay ceased
70
selling all other product variants. A second measure, known as the “80/80
Regulation” imposed an increase in the size of prescribed health warnings
on the front and back of the cigarette packages from 50% to 80%, leaving
only 20% of the cigarette pack for trademarks, logos, and other
71
information. Claimants argued that these measures impacted sales,
affected their trademark value, and reduced the value of their investments in
72
Uruguay, thus impairing the use and enjoyment of their investments. They
also argued that the measures constituted a lack of FET, a denial of justice,
73
and an indirect expropriation. Uruguay responded, inter alia, that it
adopted the measures as a matter of public health (presented as a human
right) and to implement the WHO (the “World Health Organization”)
74
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (the “FCTC”).

B. The Award
A majority of the ISDS tribunal (2-1) agreed with Uruguay that the two
challenged measures—though imperfect or even defective policy
implementations when their outcomes are measured against their stated
objective(s)—constituted a valid exercise of the country’s “police powers”
75
and “[a]s such” they could not constitute an expropriation.
The Tribunal’s main finding in this respect was that the challenged
measures were not “arbitrary and unnecessary” but rather were potentially
76
effective means to protect public health. The measures were introduced as
part of a larger scheme of tobacco control, and it was difficult to disentangle
the exact impact of their different components. Overall, however, smoking
70.
Id.
71.
Id. ¶ 11.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. ¶¶ 10–12.
74.
Id. ¶ 13; WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302
U.N.T.S. 166. See generally The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: An
Overview, WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 1, 1 (Jan. 2005),
http://www.who.int/fctc/about/WHO_FCTC_summary_January2015.pdf?ua=1.
75.
The notion of police powers in international law “refers to the state’s right to
promote a recognized ‘social purpose’ or the ‘general welfare’ by regulation.” The Uruguay
Award, supra note 18, ¶¶ 305–07 (emphasis added). In the Award, Arbitrator Gary Born
noted, in his separate opinion, that it was even “[m]indful of Uruguay’s extensive legislative
authority and broad regulatory discretion, it [was] impossible to see how a hastily-adopted
measure that is so ill-suited to its articulated purpose, and that treads so far onto protected
rights and interests, can satisfy even the Tribunal’s stated standard.” Id. Annex B ¶¶ 176–77.
See also Jon A. Stanley, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory Takings as
Defined in International Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15
EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 349, 373 (2001).
76.
The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶ 306.
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in Uruguay did decline, notably among young smokers, thus giving
77
Uruguay the benefit of the doubt with respect to policy. The two-prong test
applied by the Tribunal gave Uruguay generous regulatory leeway: the
Tribunal considered the measure valid if (a) the objective was legitimate
and (b) it was “capable of contributing to the achievement” of said policy
78
objective. The Tribunal deemed public health a legitimate objective and
the measures capable of contributing to this end. As in Eli Lilly v. Canada,
the Uruguay Award aimed to follow in the footsteps of previous ISDS
79
awards.
Human rights references appear twice in the Uruguay Award. First,
European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”) jurisprudence is used both
to reinforce the normative underpinning of the police powers doctrine and to
80
extend its scope. The Award makes capacious use of the police powers
doctrine, citing a number of previous ISDS awards—though not IP81
focused—in support of its use of ECtHR precedents. Among them was
Tecmed Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,

77.
See id.
78.
See id.
79.
See Fauchald supra note 66, at 357.; and E. Gaillard, Use of
General Principles of International Law in International Long-term contracts, INTL BUS.
LAWYER, 217 (May 1999), (“[A]rbitral tribunals have a strong tendency to use precedents
established by arbitral awards rendered in similar circumstances.”) The Uruguay Award cited,
inter alia, Methanex v. United States, a case in which the tribunal stated:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects,
inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and
compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the
government would refrain from such regulation.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part
IV ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf.
Another well-known ISDS case cited in the Award is Saluka v. Czech Republic, in which the
tribunal had noted that it was well established in international law that “states are not liable to
pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the
general welfare.” Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 255–56 (Mar.
17, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf.
80.
See The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶ 295 (“[A] range of investment decisions
have contributed to develop the scope, content and conditions of the State’s police powers
doctrine, anchoring it in international law. According to a principle recognized by these
decisions, whether a measure may be characterized as expropriatory depends on the nature
and purpose of the State’s action. Some decisions have relied on the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, based on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention.”)
Interestingly, the Award also notes, “Among international conventions to which Uruguay is a
party is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, whose Article 1,
Protocol 1, is another source of decisions regarding the police powers doctrine.” Id. at n.403.
81.
Id. at n.390.
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a case in which the arbitral tribunal examined “the actions of the State . . . to
determine whether such measures are reasonable with respect to their
82
goals.” The reference to the ECtHR decisions was not used to justify the
application of a specific right in the ECHR but rather to assess the
proportionality of the impugned measures and the state’s “margin of
appreciation” in implementing a measure when faced with competing
norms—intellectual property and investment protection on the one hand,
83
and public health on the other. The second human rights reference in the
Award appears in the description of the FCTC as guaranteeing “human
84
rights to health.” Unfortunately, the Award does not discuss the basis for
that finding nor its exact consequences.
It is worth noting that there was a significant divergence of views in the
Uruguay Award between the majority opinion and arbitrator Gary Born’s
partial dissent. Mr. Born took the view that there is no general principle of
proportionality in international treaty interpretation and that the terms of the
85
BIT between Switzerland and Uruguay should govern. The dissent also
discusses whether the “margin of appreciation” states a general principle of
international law—and therefore is applicable to all IIAs—or whether it is
instead regime-specific and thus must be found in the terms of the IIA at
86
issue. The next Part turns to that exact question.

IV. Comparative Analysis of the Awards
This Part compares the most directly relevant elements of the Canada
and Uruguay Awards—namely, the application of the margin of
appreciation doctrine and the role of human rights. It then draws lessons on
the standard of review that should apply in the ISDS context when a tribunal
is called upon to review a regulatory measure or change in the law effected
by legislation, regulation, or a court or administrative agency when such
measure or change is presented under an indirect expropriation theory or a
FET violation.

A. The Margin of Appreciation Issue
ISDS scholarship describes the state’s margin of appreciation in this
context as granting states “some latitude to make initial determinations as to
whether their actions” fall within the scope of measures not precluded by
the IIA containing the ISDS clause, so that the function of the ISDS tribunal

82.
Tecmed Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3785/DC4872_En.pdf.
83.
The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, at n.404.
84.
Id. ¶ 304.
85.
Id. Annex B ¶ 191 (Born, dissenting).
86.
See Alvarez, supra note 2, ¶¶ 138, 182–85.
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is to determine “the permissible and legitimate boundaries of the margin of
87
appreciation that arises from the terms of the [IIA].” The Uruguay Award
illustrates that, even in an ISDS proceeding, the notion can be defined more
broadly as reflecting regulatory leeway in implementing any commitment in
an international instrument.
The Uruguay Award uses ECtHR decisions revolving around a broad
margin of appreciation notion that applies to states party to the European
Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) to implement their
88
international law obligations. This notion of margin of appreciation is
89
situated at the “core of the European human rights culture.” It is common
to ECtHR jurisprudence and the EU legal order, though it is not always
90
interpreted the same way in both. At the ECtHR, it “stands for the notion
that the authorities of each party state to the [ECHR] ought to be allowed a
certain measure of discretion in implementing the standards enshrined in the
91
Convention.” By contrast, in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of
the European Union (the “CJEU”), it is used more or less interchangeably
92
with the notion of margin (or scope) of discretion. A number of
commentators note that it also fits squarely within the CJEU’s jurisprudence
93
on proportionality.
To make sense of what looks like a doctrinal salad bowl intermixing
different tests, one can turn to scholarship on the notion of margin of
appreciation, the relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU, and, more
94
generally, the relationship between the ECtHR and international law.

87.
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 370 (2008).
88.
The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶¶ 531–32. Philip Morris’ denial of justice
claim is discussed by and received some support from Gary Born, who filed a
concurring/dissenting opinion. See id. Annex B ¶¶ 44–72.
89.
NINA-LOUISA AROLD LORENZ ET AL., THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE A PARADOX OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN EUROPE? 69 (2013).
90.
Id. at 69–70.
91.
Id. at 73.
92.
See id. at 90.
93.
Id. at 91–92.
94.
See, e.g., Christina Binder, The European Court of Human Rights and the Law of
Treaties, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FRAGMENTATION OR UNITY? 41, 46, 56 (Christina Binder & Konrad Lachmayer eds., 2014)
(discussing the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR”) limited reception of
international law, including the VCLT); MAGDALENA FOROWICZ, THE RECEPTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 352 (2010) (“Although
exclusively aimed at applying and enforcing the ECHR, the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg
bodies has become porous to international sources and influences.”); HANNEKE CECIEL
KATRIJN SENDEN, INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN A MULTILEVEL LEGAL
SYSTEM : AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COURT OF
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 141 (2011) (comparing the approach of both courts un
cases involving human and fundamental rights and noting that “it would be difficult, it would
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Although this Article obviously cannot and should not try to summarize this
vast body of work, for our purposes, the narrower question we need to
answer is whether the margin of appreciation doctrine as applied by the
ECtHR and the related notion of proportionality are the optimal ways to
judge a state’s leeway in assessing a national intellectual property regime’s
95
compatibility with an IIA.
The answer depends on three elements. First, there are several notable
differences between ISDS and the ECHR. For example, the ECHR contains
a reference to what is “necessary in a democratic society,” a phrase that is
96
not common in IIAs. The term “democratic” arguably implies divergences
in the polity of views of many matters and the ability to express those
views, including on specific policy choices to implement treaty-based
97
obligations and exact implementations of such choices. This, in turn,
implies that states must have considerable leeway to implement obligations
98
in a variety of ways. States with vastly different values and political
systems enter into IIAs. To be clear, if states need policy leeway, it may not
be for democratic reasons.
Second, a number of ISDS tribunals have tried to gauge the
appropriateness or reasonableness of a measure, or the rational connection
between it and its stated objective. The margin of appreciation doctrine is
not meant to perform this function. To the contrary, as Ronald Macdonald
noted, the margin of appreciation approach may actually obscure the
99
question of appropriateness.
Third, the application of the margin of appreciation by the ECtHR “has
become increasingly intertwined with the consideration of proportionality”
in a way that makes the relationship between the two notions insufficiently
100
clear. In this sense, as noted above, the ECtHR intermixes the test just as
101
the CJEU tends to do. Proportionality at the ECtHR merely echoes the

also be highly impractical and counterproductive if two different standards of fundamental
rights protection were in force at the same time.”). See generally FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
THE EU: A MATTER FOR TWO COURTS (Sonia Morano-Foadi and Lucy Vickers eds., 2015).
95.
See Helfer supra note 21, at 9–11. Of course, neither ISDS chapters in IIAs nor the
ECHR are primarily intellectual property instruments, even though a number of ECtHR
decisions have affected IP rights. See id. at 2.
96.
European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
97.
See DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 510–20 (3d ed. 2014).
98.
See Ronald St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald ed., 1993).
99.
Id. at 124.
100.
William W. Burke-White & Andreas van Staden, Private Litigation in a Public
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 306–
07 (2010); see also Stephan W. Schill, General Principles of Law and International
Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS 154 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds., 2012).
101.
See Helfer, supra note 21, at 10.
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“fair balance” standard as required by article 1 of protocol 1 of the ECHR,
which “provides governments considerable leeway to regulate private
102
property in the public interest.” The article considers the two tests,
therefore, as functionally similar as applied. The harder question is whether
that test is useful in an ISDS context.
A state may justify a contested measure using a variety of tests. A
negative test is probably the easiest: proving that a measure is not egregious
is not hard, especially if the burden of proving egregiousness falls on the
103
complainant. Then there are positive tests.
“Rational connection” is the lowest “positive” bar that a state must pass
to justify a measure. Absent bad faith, very few measures would have no
demonstrable rational connection with their underlying policy objective.
The rational connection test is almost the reverse side of the egregiousness
coin: if a measure has a rational connection to its stated objective, it is not
104
egregious. The rational connection is not a complete bar, however.
Indeed, this is a point of disagreement between the majority and the dissent
in the Uruguay Award. Arbitrator Born did not argue that Uruguay adopted
its tobacco control measures in bad faith but wrote that “the single
presentation requirement does not bear even a minimal relationship to the
legislative objective cited by Uruguay for the requirement” and that the
105
measure was “arbitrary and irrational.”
At a higher level, one would require evidence that a measure was
106
effective in achieving its stated purpose. Under one approach—not

102.
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. For a discussion, see id.
103.
See Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing and
Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 355, 376 (2017) (“Arbitral
tribunals rely on several factors in distinguishing legitimate regulation from regulatory
expropriation. . . . Some tribunals have attempted to distinguish between the two types of
regulation by looking at their goals, nature, and the manner in which they were applied. In
doing so, they have relieved the state of the obligation to provide compensation where
regulation had a legitimate public purpose and was applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.”)
For example, in Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award ¶ 132 (June 26, 2003), the panel noted that the
complainant had to establish “[m]anifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading
to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety.”
104.
See, e.g., Belokon v. Kyrgyz Republic, Award, ¶¶ 231–34 (Oct. 24, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/3804 (finding that the administration of a bank
during a period of violent regime had no rational connection with the state’s objectives);
Charles H. Brower II, Politics, Reason, and the Trajectory of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 271, 298 n.117 (2017).
105.
The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, Annex 2 ¶¶ 86, 88 (Born, dissenting).
106.
Arguably the dissent in Phillip Morris v. Uruguay is situated somewhere between
absence of a rational connection and lack of demonstrable effectiveness. See id. annex 2 ¶
119. (“[T]here were no documents or other materials accompanying any of the drafts of the
proposed ordinances (in either 2008 or 2009) that explained the purpose or background of the
single presentation requirement or how the requirement was contemplated to work in practice,
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applied in ISDS but common in international trade law—the state must
prove that the measure was the least restrictive among available alternatives
107
under the so-called “necessity tests.” The egregiousness standard adopted
in the Canada Award may seem easier to apply than the broad but fuzzy
police powers doctrine used in the Uruguay Award. Yet, in this Article’s
view, they do not differ much in practice, for it is suggested that a measure
would run afoul of the margin of appreciation in most cases if it was
egregious, or worse, adopted in bad faith. Then, as already mentioned,
egregiousness is arguably the flip side of rational connection, though its
108
application might differ if burdens of proof are reversed.
Naturally, a tribunal might be tempted to overlay its application of these
tests with a normative pro-investor veneer given that a main object and
109
purpose of ISDS instruments is to protect investors. The trade law
standard from the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”). that requires a
WTO member to show that it adopted the least trade-restrictive regulatory
measure would transform ISDS radically and severely restrict regulatory
110
leeway, but it is, as noted, not applied in ISDS. Put differently, though
most ISDS tribunals will not second-guess the choice of policy objective of
a respondent state, tribunals have two options: either limit themselves to
gauging the appropriateness of the measure or insist on getting evidence
from the respondent state that the measure was the least investmentrestrictive measure. The choice between those two options can lead to vastly
different outcomes. Applying the margin of appreciation/proportionality
doctrine or its doctrinal cousin—the egregiousness test—limits a tribunal’s
nor that addressed any empirical evidence that would bear upon the requirement’s goals or
efficacy.”)
107.
Various variants (and thus exact levels) of this test exist. See WTO Secretariat,
“Necessity Tests” in the WTO, WTO doc. S/WPDR/W/27 (Dec. 2, 2003).
108.
The burden of proving a violation under the egregiousness standard would seem to
fall naturally on the complainant. The rational connection test could be used either as an
integral part of the complainant’s case, in which case that party would bear the burden of
proving an absence of rational connection (something similar to the approach chosen by the
WTO Panel in Australia Plain Packaging—Panel Report, Australia—Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications And Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable To Tobacco Products And Packaging, ¶¶ 7.2418–7.2420, WTO Docs.
WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R (adopted June 28, 2018)
[hereinafter WTO Plain Packaging Report]), or as a defense resting on the respondent’s
shoulders.
109.
The VCLT, supra note 54, provides the rules of treaty interpretation used by ISDS
tribunals. Article 31(1) of the VCLT states that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Busta v. Czech
Republic, Case No. V 2015/014, Final Award, ¶ 115 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber Com.
Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8558.pdf,
(“The object and purpose of the BIT is the “promotion and protection of investments”).
110.
In an ISDS context, this might be called the least investor-impacting measure. See
Peter Van den Bossche, Looking for Proportionality in WTO Law, 35 LEGAL ISSUES ECON.
INTEGRATION 283, 288 (2008).
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ability to restrict states to the least investment-impacting measure and is
likely to provide more regulatory autonomy.
Perhaps because of this, a number of ICSID tribunals have chosen to
follow the ECtHR’s path, at least formally. Those awards then tend to
mention “proportionality” explicitly, as in Total v. Argentina, a case in
which the tribunal stated that the “reasonableness of the normative changes
challenged and their appropriateness in light of a criterion of proportionality
111
also have to be taken into account.”
There, the tribunal used
proportionality to balance “the investor’s interest in regulatory stability and
112
the host State’s interest in adaptation of the regularity framework . . . .”
How does margin of appreciation or proportionality apply in the context
of intellectual property and its link with policy targets such as public health,
access to health innovations, and innovation policy? Choosing to follow the
ECtHR’s approach affords considerable leeway to a state’s regulatory
interventions. All arbitrators in the Uruguay Award recognized the
importance of the public health objective that supported the restriction of
Philip Morris’s use of its trademarks, though one arbitrator dissented on the
113
appropriateness analysis and the very role of the tribunal in assessing it.
This demonstrates that the ISDS/IP interface is quite unlikely to clash on the
purpose of an IP measure (e.g., innovation or public health). The dispute is
much more likely to center on how appropriate the measure is when viewed
from an investment protection perspective. Hence, imperfect as it may be,
applying the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation standard—and the related
notion of proportionality to which it is increasingly assimilated—to answer
this question leads to more favorable outcomes for respondent states than
the application of the stricter standard of whether the challenged measure is
the least investor-impacting.
The fact that the reasoning used by the ECtHR in assessing
proportionality has been called upon in a number of ISDS awards to cross
legal systems from human rights to international investment law shows the
range of available standards that an ISDS tribunal might apply when
reviewing state actions, “particularly[] the application of defenses . . . that
114
raise quasi-constitutional issues.” That being said, some, but far from all,
ISDS tribunals have agreed to cross the definitional waters that separate the
ECHR and IIAs. In von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, for example, the tribunal
stated:
[D]ue caution should be exercised in importing concepts from other
legal regimes (in this case European human rights law) without a

111.
Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on
Liability, ¶ 134 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf.
112.
Schill, supra note 98, at 156.
113.
See supra notes 75 and 88.
114.
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 100, at 302.
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solid basis for doing so. Balancing competing (and non-absolute)
human rights and the need to grant States a margin of appreciation
when making those balancing decisions is well established in
human rights law, but the Tribunal is not aware that the concept has
115
found much support in international investment law.
Still, the increasingly frequent use of ECtHR cases in ISDS awards might
make it jurisprudence constante, which would be a significant development
116
given the common law approach used by most ISDS tribunals. Part V
explains how this can be accomplished in structured fashion.

B. A Role for Human Rights in ISDS Disputes Involving IP
As noted in the previous Part, unlike the Canada Award, the Uruguay
Award expressly mentions human rights, specifically the right to health as
enshrined in the FCTC. This was not a surprise, as references to human
117
rights are common in ISDS awards. However, a survey of ISDS awards
showed that “references to European human rights law are, in fact, as likely
to come from investor claimants as respondent states. They are, in short, as
likely to be used as a sword in favor of investor rights than as a shield to
118
defend against them.” Indeed, “the ECHR and international investment
regimes share at least two common general substantive goals: to protect
119
access to justice and to protect some forms of property.”
To take a regional example, the right to the protection of property is
also one of the fundamental rights protected by the EU Charter, as is the
120
freedom to conduct business. Some ISDS awards used those rights to
adopt a narrow approach to other fundamental rights arguments. For
example, an ISDS award noted that the term “basic rights” in an IIA should
be interpreted to refer to “basic property rights,” not the broader legal and
115.
von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, ¶¶ 465–66
(July 28, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7095_0.pdf.
116.
See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶
108 (Sept. 5, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf.
On the common law approach, see Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, supra note 34. Jurisprudence constante may be defined as “a body of case law
that meets a sufficient threshold of uniformity and consistency[. It] is, at a maximum,
persuasive, but with ‘considerable authoritative force.’” Paul Cho, What if the International
Criminal Court Could Prosecute President al-Assad for the Chemical Weapon Attacks in
Ghouta?, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 165, 189 (2017).
117.
See José E. Alvarez, The Use (and Misuse) of European Fundamental Rights Law
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 519, 524 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2017).
118.
Id. (emphasis added).
119.
Id. at 525.
120.
Id. Examples of ISDS awards where the “fundamental right of property” in the
ECHR was mentioned include Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01,
Decision on Liability, ¶ 129 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf.
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political rights that one might expect to be referenced by the term under the
121
ECHR or other human rights instruments. This is not always the case,
however. What can be described as broader human rights—in this context,
rights beyond private property protection—played a role in a number of
other ISDS awards. In Tulip Real Estate and Development v. Republic of
Turkey, for example, the tribunal referenced, first, article 31(3)(c) of the
VCLT and noted in this context that the VCLT’s reference to “relevant rules
of international law” covered all sources of international law, including
122
human rights law. It then concluded that “[p]rovisions in human rights
instruments dealing with the right to a fair trial” were relevant to the
interpretation of the ICSID Convention and that using them did not add
123
obligations extraneous to the ICSID Convention.
The door is thus open to both parties to ISDS disputes to bring human
rights arguments, whether for the investor to support the “property”
component of intellectual property or for the state to justify measures to
limit the scope of an intellectual property right. No explicit rule prevents an
ISDS tribunal from considering such arguments, including as a way to
124
“balance” outcomes. Let us now see what can be done to push the
argument one or more steps further.

C. Lessons Drawn from Comparing the Awards
The Canada and Uruguay cases have both been described as efforts by
multinational investors to limit the state’s ability to regulate its intellectual
property regime by threatening to impose financial “penalties” for making
125
decisions unfavorable to the complainants. The two cases were ultimately
decided on very different bases. In Eli Lilly v. Canada, the right of domestic
courts to make and change IP law was affirmed by the tribunal but

121.
Al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶ 521 (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf.
122.
Tulip Real Estate & Dev. Neth. B.V. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/28, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 87 (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw7037.pdf.
123.
Id. ¶ 92.
124.
The desire of a number of arbitration tribunals to achieve balance in their decisions
has been studied by a number of scholars. Puig and Strezhnev have identified frequent
attempts to take account of the parties’ unequal access to legal resources, for example. See,
e.g., Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, The David Effect and ISDS, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 731,
733 (2017) (“[E]ven in the absence of formal guidance, investment arbitrators pay attention to
the capabilities and potential resource constraints of the parties and behave in a way that is
consistent with a preference for rectifying inequalities in litigation resources.”).
125.
Cf. Vadi, supra note 37, at 186 (describing a trend of investors using international
arbitration to challenge state regulatory regimes); Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property
“Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the International Intellectual Property System, 35 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1123–24 (2014) (arguing that, if Eli Lilly succeeds in requiring Canada
to change its utility standard, the implications could be “stunning” for intellectual property
policy “in all countries”).
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considered reviewable—subject in an ISDS context to an egregiousness
126
standard—absent a failure of due process. As a standard to measure
domestic judicial decisions, egregiousness leaves scant room for human
rights to enter the debate; it is not easy to see how a human or fundamental
rights argument would make an otherwise egregious court decision
acceptable. In contrast, the Uruguay Award expressly used the ECtHR’s
margin of appreciation notion to recognize the state’s police powers to
127
regulate health, a key public policy area. It also referred to the right to
health enshrined in the WHO’s FCTC. Hence, though both the Canada and
Uruguay ISDS awards give a good measure of deference to public policy
128
measures, they do so on very different grounds.
The police powers doctrine used in the Uruguay Award undoubtedly
provides states with a fair degree of flexibility for acts by all branches of
129
government. Put differently, the Award anchors in both the ECtHR’s
margin of appreciation doctrine and the FCTC’s guarantee of the right to
130
health, thus giving Uruguay almost invincible regulatory autonomy. The
Tribunal’s normative triangle—with public policy goals in one corner, the
possible influence of human rights in another, and the impact on the
131
investor in a third corner—mirrors the Venn diagram in the introduction.
It effectuates a “balancing” that offers significant analytical latitude to
future ISDS tribunals willing to follow in those footsteps. By the same
token, however, because the Tribunal’s framework widens the analytical
spotlight, it may also give claimants more weapons, as the frequent use of
fundamental rights to property by investors demonstrates.
In contrast, the tribunal in Eli Lilly v. Canada required a more focused
discussion of the egregiousness of a measure—in this case, a court
decision—which limited the scope of the analytical exercise. Though the
egregiousness standard may not be crystalline, it provides a high bar for
claimants and thus a good degree of predictability for the future—recalling
that, beyond the substantive elements of the standard, the evidentiary burden
rests with the claimant. For most states, the Canada Award provides a broad
shield against ISDS challenges to judicial acts.
Based on this analysis of the tools available to ISDS tribunals, the
Article now turns to a discussion of whether the doctrinal bridges built in
these two IP-focused awards are sufficiently robust, especially in an EU
context in which the need to comply with fundamental EU Charter rights
132
might be invoked.
126.
Common law courts do make and change the law; they do not merely interpret it.
See supra Part II.A.
127.
See supra Part III.A.
128.
See supra Parts II and III.
129.
See supra note 80.
130.
See supra Part IV.A.
131.
See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying illustration.
132.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/391.
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V. A Path Toward Inclusive ISDS
The prominent cases at the IP/ISDS interface, Philip Morris v. Uruguay
and Eli Lilly v. Canada, reveal different paths that ISDS tribunals can
follow in factoring in public interest considerations. Philip Morris keeps
public interest at bay by imposing the egregiousness test, a very difficult test
for investors to meet, while Eli Lilly expressly balances investor protection
133
against the public interest reflected in human rights. These different
outcomes may be due in part to IP’s peculiar nature. IP stands, both
134
normatively and doctrinally, with a foot in both private and public law. It
thus differs from the more traditional property, or private law, interests that
ISDS aims to protect. IP incorporates public policy objectives such as
innovation, access to information, and public health, which are reflected in
the mix of rights, limitations and exceptions to the IP rights of authors and
135
inventors. As a relatively new phenomenon in the ISDS field (few ISDS
tribunals have heard IP-related cases), Eli Lilly v. Canada and Philip Morris
v. Uruguay serve as exemplars to probe how ISDS tribunals can deal with
investment protection while factoring in broader public interest issues. The
stark divergence of approach by the two tribunals illuminates the difficulty
faced by ISDS tribunals in this context. Outcomes are difficult, if not
impossible, to predict.
In this Part, the Article suggests a structured approach to build a robust
interface between ISDS and IP against the backdrop of lessons learned from
Eli Lilly and Philip Morris. Then, we answer the question of whether IP can
serve, as the title of the Article suggests, as a beacon in other areas of law
where public policy impacts the use of private property rights. The proposed
approach could thus serve as a model doctrinal path for ISDS tribunals that
wish to factor the public interest into their deliberations. The Article
suggests that ISDS interpretive approaches that take account of the public
interest can be termed inclusive ISDS, as opposed to ISDS focusing strictly
on investor protection, which can be termed exclusive ISDS.

A. Applicable Parameters
International law does not recognize a supremacy or hierarchy of
human or fundamental rights over trade and investment rules—at least not
136
beyond jus cogens. As the International Law Commission noted, there is

133.
See supra Part IV.C.
134.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
135.
See Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How
Ethics Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop. &
Competition Law, Research Paper No. 13-06, 2013).
136.
Jus cogens, or “compelling law,” refers to a body of “norms of general international
law from which no derogation is possible.” Valentina Vadi, Jus Cogens in International
Investment Law and Arbitration, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 357, 357 (2015). Jus cogens can and
has been applied by ISDS tribunals. See id. at 382 (“[J]us cogens . . . can play a legitimising
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thus a possibility of “fragmentation” in this context. Therefore, building
an interface between IP and ISDS or a triangular one between IP, ISDS, and
human rights requires the application of norms from each sector
“horizontally” to another area. As the previous Part demonstrated, beyond
the text of IIAs, several key principles of international law permeate ISDS
awards in a way that allows norms to cross legal disciplinary borders,
particularly (a) the fundamental or human right to property and human
rights invoked by respondent states to justify measures designed to
implement such rights; (b) the notion of a state’s margin of appreciation
“borrowed” from ECtHR jurisprudence; and (c) other basic principles such
as the right to a fair trial.
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, also regularly invoked by ISDS
tribunals, provide useful interpretive pathways for the texts of IIAs that may
supplement or replace the use of the ECtHR jurisprudence and the notions
138
of margin of appreciation and proportionality. VCLT “general balancing
principles (such as transparency, non-discrimination, necessity, and
proportionality) [are] used in deciding on whether national restrictions of
139
freedom of trade are necessary for the protection of public interests.” Not
unlike a number of ISDS cases discussed above, WTO dispute settlement
reports often limit the scope of their review of WTO Members’ regulatory
autonomy on the basis of general balancing principles, not ECtHR
decisions. Moreover, such reports arguably have tended to apply a greater
degree of deference when the policy area is of great importance, such as
140
public health.
One could end the analysis here and suggest that ISDS tribunals already
have at their disposal a sufficient doctrinal toolbox composed of (a) the
margin of appreciation and proportionality doctrines, which they can anchor
in ECtHR jurisprudence, (b) the related police powers doctrine, and (c) the
VCLT, which can support balancing efforts based on those doctrines. Is
there another, possibly better option?

B. Express Interfaces
Including express interfaces in the text of IIAs is a common practice in
trade law but thus far has not been used much in investment law. This

role in investor-state arbitration, making sure that the most fundamental values of the
international community are not violated by either foreign investors or host states . . . .”).
137.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
2006).
138.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
139.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining
and Connecting the Two Fields, in Human Rights And International Trade (Th. Cottier, J.
Pauwelyn, and E. Bürgi, eds) 29, 34 (2005).
140.
See id. and the discussion on TRIPS and public health mentioned supra note 50.
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Section thus considers how such interfaces function in trade law to
determine whether there are obstacles to their use in the ISDS context.
Express interfaces can be seen as filters that limit claims that can pass
141
through the jurisdictional sieve. The necessity test is an example of a
filter: the tribunal can review a measure and must decide whether it passes
142
the test. An exclusion, in contrast, means that, if the measure is found to
be covered by the text of the exclusion clause, the tribunal must decline to
143
review its adequacy.

1. Express Interfaces in Trade Law
IIAs often contain express interfaces between trade law and
fundamental rights that can take the form of either specific or general
exceptions.
Specific exceptions are those linked to the exercise by the state of a
specific policy objective. Such interfaces provide leeway for identified
regulatory measures to be taken without a violation of the state’s
commitments and other trade obligations. Specific interfaces thus usually
apply to named policy areas such as labor, environment, and sustainable
development. Exceptions of this type are contained, for example, in the
144
majority of post-WTO (1995) trade agreements negotiated by the EU.
They often take the form of a list of international conventions setting out
applicable standards that a member state (or the EU itself) has the right to
145
implement.
Another option is to provide safeguards for labor,
environment, and sustainable development that put these interests expressly
above that of trade liberalization. For example, under article 23.2 of the
CETA, the parties “seek to ensure those laws and policies provide for and
encourage high levels of labour protection and shall strive to continue to

141.
See Lise Johnson et al., International Investments Agreements, 2014: A Review of
Trends and New Approaches, 2016 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 15, 47.
142.
See id. (“Filter mechanisms limit the issues that tribunals may review, at least in the
first instance; however, if the designated body or committee is unable to resolve the issue, it
often reverts back to the tribunal for determination.”).
143.
See id. (Exclusions go “a step further by excluding certain types of measures from
review by arbitral tribunals altogether. These ISDS exclusions differ from filter mechanisms
in that they preclude certain types of measures or actions from ever being reviewed by the
tribunal.”).
144.
CETA, supra note 23; Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the
Republic of Singapore, supra note 23; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the
European Union and Its Member States, on the One Hand, and Central America on the Other,
supra note 23; Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the
One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, supra note 23; Free Trade Agreement
Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of
Korea, of the Other Part, supra note 23.
145.
See, e.g., Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of
the One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, supra note 23.
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improve such laws and policies with the goal of providing high levels of
146
labour protection.”
General exceptions, in contrast, aim to preserve a state’s “right to
147
regulate.” This “right to regulate” permits a departure from specific
investment commitments assumed by a state. In a functioning democracy, it
could also be defined as “an affirmation of states’ authority to act as
148
sovereigns on behalf of the will of the people.” Whichever definition is
accepted, one can legitimately posit that the right to regulate cannot be
merely “what’s left” after a chunk of sovereignty is given up by a state in an
IIA, as this would place trade liberalization commitments above other
international legal obligations. Hence, the right to regulate is best seen as a
principle ensuring that restrictions on state sovereignty are not interpreted as
149
interfering with key areas of public policy.
The most important general exceptions are those contained in article
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”) and
article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the “GATS”).
The latter targets, inter alia, measures “necessary to protect public morals
or to maintain public order” and “necessary to protect human . . . life or
150
health.” They are thus subject to what is usually referred to as a necessity
151
test. This test posits that trade liberalization commitments should trump
other policy areas but for a demonstrable necessity (however that term is
152
then defined in context) to adopt certain regulatory measures.
There are in fact several versions of this necessity test in WTO
153
Agreements. A classic exposition of one of the principal necessity tests is
146.
CETA, supra note 23, art. 23.2; see also Free Trade Agreement Between the
European Union and the Republic of Singapore, supra note 23, art. 13.2, ¶ 2; Trade
Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and
Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, supra note 23, art. 268.
147.
AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
52 (2014) (summarizing the “right to regulate”); id. at 169 (“Another way of incorporating an
express right to regulate in an IIA is to draft a general regulatory clause applicable to the
entire treaty.”).
148.
LONE WANDHAL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 8 (2016).
149.
See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48,
58–79 (2008) (comparing deference in trade and investment law toward the right to regulate).
150.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183
(emphasis added).
151.
See “Necessity Tests” in the WTO, supra note 111.
152.
See Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149, 1206–07 (2013).
153.
See Working Party on Domestic Regulation, supra note 111, ¶ 4 (referring to
necessity tests (plural) and noting that “in spite of similarities between the wording of
necessity tests in different WTO provisions, an interpretation developed in the context of one
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contained in a report by the WTO Appellate Body, which explains that the
following factors are relevant to test: (i) the degree of contribution made by
the measure to the legitimate objective at issue; (ii) the trade-restrictiveness
of the measure; and (iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of
154
consequences that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective. It
adds, “[i]n most cases, a comparison of the challenged measure and possible
155
alternative measures should be undertaken.” This can be a very heavy
burden to bear for a state to justify a measure, depending on (a) which party
has the burden of proving the degree of contribution and traderestrictiveness of the impugned measure and the existence of alternative
measures and (b) how “necessary” the measure is, as WTO cases reveal
falling within broad range, the bookends of which are indispensability
156
and just making a contribution respectively.
157
Similar general exceptions are found in a number of IIAs. General
interfaces do not prescribe the type of measure that can be taken by the
158
state, but they do provide a standard against which they can be measured.
A normative view of the right to regulate could be used to support the
argument that the more a measure targets an area of significant public
interest (such as implementing human rights obligations), the easier it
becomes to justify its necessity before a trade dispute settlement tribunal.
Actual recourse to either specific or general interfaces not specific to IP
to justify a prima facie violation of an IP-related commitment contained in a
trade agreement is infrequent for two interrelated reasons. First, there is a
self-evident reason why specific interfaces not specific to IP are not used in
IP-related cases. There are specific ones that would usually be applied first
159
as the more targeted lex specialis. Second, lex specialis also explains why
general exceptions are not typically invoked in trade disputes concerning IP.

case cannot be automatically transposable to other provisions. Each provision would have to
be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement of which it is part.”)
154.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 322, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R
(adopted May 16, 2012).
155.
Id.
156.
See Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 39
AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 416 (2013); Eric M. Solovy & Pavan S. Krishnamurthy, TRIPS
Agreement Flexibilities and Their Limitations: A Response to the UN Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel Report on Access to Medicines, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 69, 109
(2017) (“Article 27.2 [of the TRIPS Agreement] contains a necessity test, which creates a
significant burden on the Member taking advantage of this exception.”).
157.
See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and
Domestic Health Protections—Is A General Exceptions Clause A Forced Perspective?, 39
AM. J.L. & MED. 332, 336–41 (2013).
158.
See id. at 333.
159.
Lex specialis is a principle of legal text interpretation according to which a law
governing a specific subject matter overrides a law that only governs general matters (or lex
generalis). The Article discusses the interfaces specific to IP below. See infra Part V.B. See
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The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the
“TRIPS”) itself contains two interfaces with fundamental rights. First,
TRIPS provides its own “general” exception: “Members may . . . adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with
160
the provisions of this Agreement.” Second, TRIPS contains a specific
exception allowing WTO Members to exclude from patentability “the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
161
animal or plant life or health.” That second interface is also found in
162
NAFTA. Both TRIPS exceptions use the term “necessary,” a version of
163
the above-mentioned necessity test.
There are alternatives to the necessity test(s). Recall, first, that trade law
includes a range of definitions of necessity that varies from being
indispensable to simple evidence that a measure is “making a contribution”
164
to the policy objective pursued by the authority that adopted the measure.
Tribunals can even go below this range. Arguably, the lowest possible
standard is that of rational connection: that is, merely proving that the
measure is rationally connected to its stated objective would be sufficient to
excuse a violation (or a trade obligation or, in the case of an ISDS
165
proceeding, an expropriation or FET violation). The test was used in a
negative context by the WTO Appellate Body to explain that a measure that
bears “no rational connection to the objective” would be arbitrary and
166
unjustifiable under GATT article XX, which governs general exceptions.
At that point, any measure short of an arbitrary one passes the test.
We see something like this highly flexible approach in the 2018 panel
report on the WTO dispute between Australia, on the one hand, and Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Indonesia, on the other hand. This
dispute addressed whether Australia’s ban on figurative trademarks and
also GRAEME DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS:
THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 186 (2012).
160.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 8.1. This text was not applicable in the
Canada dispute because it is not contained in NAFTA, the IP chapter of which otherwise
mirrors TRIPS to a large extent. See Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in International
Copyright, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 374 (1998) (“The NAFTA intellectual
property provisions were negotiated based on an early draft of the TRIPS Agreement, so the
two agreements bear a striking resemblance to each other.”)
161.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art 27.2.
162.
NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1709, ¶ 2.
163.
See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 152, at 1205.
164.
See Stumberg supra note 156 at 408–9.
165.
See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, ¶ 227, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007). The Appellate Body did
not say, however, that this was the only test to determine compatibility with Art. XX.
166.
Id.

Winter 2019]

Investor State Disputes & IP

319

severe restrictions on the use of word marks on cigarette packs—known as
“plain packaging” measures—violated article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement
prohibition on imposing “special requirements” that “encumber the use” of
167
marks. The Australian measure plainly did. In that case, the panel refused
to exclude the possibility that a rational connection might be ample reason
168
to justify the prohibited encumbrance. As noted above, applying a rational
connection test is probably the most generous way to provide regulatory
flexibility, one which parallels in a positive way the negative test of
169
egregiousness used in the Canada Award. A state authority can, in almost
every case, demonstrate a rational connection between a measure and its
underlying objective and, hence, any measure short of a purely arbitrary one
170
would pass the test.
Consider, in addition, then, that in Australia – Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications And Other Plain
Packaging Requirements Applicable To Tobacco Products And Packaging,
the panel imposed on the complainants the burden of proving the absence of
171
justification. This means that the case was, for all practical purposes,
unwinnable. By imposing a burden on complainants to prove an absence of
rational connection—despite acknowledging that the challenged measures
were a priori prohibited by article 20 but for the justification test—the panel
made it all but certain that Australia would win no matter what the evidence
showed. The Australia panel report may be overturned or its application and
172
practical import otherwise highly limited on appeal.

2. Application to ISDS
Can language used to formulate exceptions to trade rules, whether IPspecific or not, be used to craft an ISDS/IP interface? Several IIAs already
contain sector-specific exclusions, some of which apply to both trade and
investment using the same language. For example, the FTA between the EU
and Singapore states that “it is inappropriate to encourage trade or
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic
173
labour and environment laws.” The Association Agreement between the
167.
See generally WTO Plain Packaging Report, supra note 108.
168.
See id. at 729.
169.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
170.
See Stumberg, supra note 156.
171.
See WTO Plain Packaging Report, supra note 108, ¶ 7.2169–7.2171, 7.2331.
(establishing, at 729, that “unjustifiable discrimination” consists of the absence of
justification, and holding at 679–80, that the complainant bears the “initial burden of proof”
for establishing “unjustifiable discrimination”).
172.
See Notification of an Appeal by Honduras, Australia—Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/23 (July 25, 2018).
173.
See also Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of
Singapore, supra note 23, art. 12.1, ¶ 3; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the
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EU and Central America goes a step further in its article 291(2), which
requires parties “not to waive or derogate from, or offer to waive or
derogate from, its labour or environmental legislation in a manner affecting
174
trade or as an encouragement for the establishment.”
In addition,
paragraph 3 demands that parties “shall not fail to effectively enforce its
labour and environmental legislation in a manner affecting trade or
175
investment between the Parties.”
To port this type of exclusion to the ISDS/IP context, one must start
from the premise that, because the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals is tied to
176
the text of the IIA, language matters enormously. Hence, a provision
recognizing a state’s “right to regulate” its IP policy, for example, would be
significantly constrained by attaching a necessity test or language that
allows state regulation, “provided it is consistent with other provisions of
177
this agreement,” such as that found in TRIPS article 8.1. Second, a “right
to regulate” IP taking the form of a general “public interest” clause would
facially offer broad flexibility, but it could be counterproductive if limited to
178
specific public interest sectors, such as public health. Recall the question
posed in the introduction: if a state were to add a sector-specific “right to
regulate” clause (say, for environmental protection or public health) to an
IIA, would this not prompt an investor to argue both that earlier IIAs
without this clause do not, a contrario, provide the necessary regulatory
flexibility and that new IIAs do not provide such flexibility in other,
179
unnamed sectors? This concern is real: intellectual property—and the
human rights that support some claims to protect or limit IP—is typically
not named in express interfaces in the IP chapters of recent EU IIAs. A
limited right to regulate specific to other sectors, such as the protection of
the environment, might thus deepen the legal morass for IP because IP sits
outside those IIAs’ sector-specific “right to regulate” clauses.
There is, as mentioned above, at least one ISDS/IP specific interface:
180
the one contained in the CETA. It is best seen as an exclusion rather than
as a filter in that it is meant to exclude an evaluation by an ISDS tribunal of
181
substantive intellectual property rules. Both the substance and the timing
of the exclusion—occurring after the finalization of the main CETA text but
European Union and Its Member States, on the One Hand, and Central America on the Other,
supra note 23, art. 291, ¶ 1.
174.
Agreement Establishing an Association Between Central America, on the One
Hand, and the European Union and Its Member States, of the Other, art 291(2), June 29, 2012,
O.J.L. 346 15.12.2012.
175.
Id. Art. 291(3). ¶ 1
176.
See TITI, supra note 147, at 111–15.
177.
See id.
178.
See id. at 99–103.
179.
See id. at 294–95.
180.
CETA, supra note 23.
181.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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as Eli Lilly v. Canada was proceeding—suggest that it was informed by the
182
filing of the case against Canada by Eli Lilly. The CETA negotiators
added to this declaration that investor state dispute settlement tribunals “are
not an appeal mechanism for the decisions of domestic courts” and that “the
domestic courts of each Party are responsible for the determination of the
183
existence and validity of intellectual property rights.” CETA also reasserts
that “each Party shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement regarding intellectual
184
property within their own legal system and practice.” This exclusionary
clause was described as the beginning of a new trend in international
185
investment law. Indeed, the exclusion is mirrored in a more recent text,
and an important one: the EU draft of the Transatlantic Trade and
186
Investment Partnership (the “TTIP”).
The CETA precedent suggests that express exclusions of a range of IPrelated regulatory measures in future IIAs are both possible and desirable.
Indeed, CETA could serve as a model due to its exclusion of judicial or
other measures concerning the “existence and validity of intellectual
187
property rights.” This Article supports this type of exclusion even though,
as noted above, they must be crafted carefully to avoid a contrario
inclusions of certain measures in the scope of ISDS review, whether in IP or
188
other regulatory areas.
182.
See supra note 24.
183.
CETA, supra note 23, annex 8-D. This CETA exclusion may never enter into force
for two reasons. First, in October 2016, after opposition from, inter alia, Wallonia (the
French-speaking part of Belgium), it was reportedly agreed that the ISDS provisions of CETA
would be submitted to the ECJ to determine their compatibility with EU law, in particular the
ability of EU member states to implement and enforce public policy and fundamental rights.
See Glyn Moody, EU-Canada Trade Deal Dodges Belgian Veto for Now, but Faces Multiple
Legal Challenges, TECHDIRT (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20161027/
09490835898/eu-canada-trade-deal-dodges-belgian-veto-now-faces-multiple-legalchallenges.shtml. Second, unanimous support from all 28 EU member states is required to
ratify CETA, and in June 2018, Italy said it would oppose the agreement. See Francesca
Landini, Italy Won’t Ratify EU Free-Trade Deal with Canada: Farm Minister, REUTERS
(June 24, 2018 8:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-minister-canadatrade/italy-wont-ratify-eu-free-trade-deal-with-canada-farm-minister-idUSKBN1JA0TR.
184.
CETA, supra note 23, annex 8-D; see also Vadi, supra note 37, at 191.
185.
See Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare? Intellectual Property Rights,
Health, and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment Agreements, 6 J
INT’L DIS. SETL’T 252, 260-1 (2015).).
186.
Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes, Eur.
Union (Nov. 12, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/Nov./tradoc_153955.pdf
(“For greater certainty, the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights to
the extent that these measures are consistent with TRIPS and Chapter X (Intellectual Property)
of this Agreement, do not constitute expropriation. Moreover, a determination that these
actions are inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement or Chapter X (Intellectual Property) of this
Agreement does not establish that there has been an expropriation.”).
187.
CETA, supra note 23, annex 8-D.
188.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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What if a state wished to go further and design a broader exclusion?
Human rights arguments could play a role in that they constitute a good
example of a key public policy area in which a state may be expected to act.
As noted above, nothing prohibits ISDS tribunals from considering
189
fundamental or human rights norms by the text of IIAs. This lack of
prohibition, however, is unlikely to be good enough in this context. How
can one ensure that these norms are fully considered in interpreting the
scope and depth of the regulatory leeway used by the state? One way to
make a human rights argument effective would be to require that
interpretation of the IIAs should not contravene an applicable human rights
190
obligation. Interpreting the text of a measure challenged by an investor—
whether as indirect expropriation or a FET violation—can be directly linked
to the state’s implementation of its human rights obligations or even of a
key public policy objective. An interpretive rule to that effect could be
added to IIAs in addition to specific exclusions.
Following this suggestion would mean that when a measure challenged
under the notions of indirect expropriation or FET can be directly
reconciled with a state’s regulatory autonomy in an area of vital
socioeconomic importance and/or a state’s implementation of its human
rights obligations, then that measure should be presumed to be valid unless
it can be shown that it was adopted to circumvent the underlying
191
obligation. The proposed approach of applying the anti-circumvention test
(well-known in trade law) changes the respondent state’s burden to rely on
general notions such as the police powers doctrine, on which there is no
consensus among ISDS tribunals. It also offers a clearer analytical path,
namely asking, once it has been determined that the policy is in an area of
vital socioeconomic importance, whether it was meant to circumvent
192
investment protection obligations. This would have a potent effect that is
“normatively stabilizing at a time when there are few agreed answers about

189.
See supra Part IV.B.
190.
This is in line with Professor Wai’s suggestion that “an investment panel should not
demand unduly high standards of compensation for regulatory or other legal reform directed
towards the achievement of international human rights.” Wai, supra note 22, at 71.
191.
The phrase “area of vital socio-economic importance” is taken from the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 50, art. 8.1.
192.
On the application of the anti-circumvention test in trade law, see Diane A.
Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations
and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INTL. L. 51, 118 (2014):
WTO law purposely delineates between a State’s justifiable exercise of regulatory
freedom, from protectionist measures designed to circumvent commitments under
the WTO Agreements. These trade agreements purposely accept that a margin of
domestic regulatory freedom must continue to be maintained both as a matter of
economic efficiency [. . .] as well as to build in a “safety-valve” precaution against
unforeseeable contingencies that could disrupt the anticipated or forecasted terms
of trade.
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the costs and benefits of globalization or the ideal shape of global economic
193
governance in relationship to differing domestic policy paths.”
The suggested approach is not the same as the application of the
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation doctrine. It may be supported as an
offshoot of the doctrine in that it situates a state’s implementation of its IP
policy within a “margin of appreciation” if it passes the above-mentioned
contravention test. The approach also does not resemble current trade law,
194
either in the form of the necessity test or the justification test. Rather, it is
an explicit presumption of validity in case a measure can be directly
reconciled with a state’s regulatory autonomy in an area of vital
socioeconomic importance and/or a state’s implementation of its human
rights obligations. The mobilizing principle, the Article suggests, should not
be one of unimpeded and unaccountable state autonomy. A balance must be
found between regulatory autonomy and protection of foreign investors
against regulatory measures amounting to an expropriation. The proposed
approach would both simplify and make more predictable the outcome of
cases such as the two awards reviewed in this Article. It offers tribunals a
clearer analytical path that does not rely on fuzzy norms such as
egregiousness (which, in any event, is mostly limited to court decisions) or
the police powers doctrine. ISDS clauses have legitimate purposes, among
them strengthening the rule of law and deterring foreign governments from
195
imposing discriminatory or abusive requirements.
The suggested
approach, therefore, is not to eliminate ISDS entirely but rather to apply the
proper test when ISDS is used to challenge regulatory measures and to carve
out policy areas in which ISDS should simply not venture. These carve-outs
are required in areas where public interest considerations are likely to
outweigh investment or property protection, bearing in mind that, in most
cases, the investor still has access to domestic courts.
Such a debate could be had in the context of the preparatory work for
the Multilateral Investment Court (the “MIC”) proposed by the EU, as the
creation of a new forum provides a significant opportunity to ameliorate the
196
current system. The EU’s commitment to the establishment of this court

193.
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years on: Global Governance by
Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 76 (2016).
194.
On the necessity test, see Solovy & Krishnamurthy,supra note 153. On the
justification test, see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
195.
See Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson, Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership: Using Investor-State Dispute Settlement to Strengthen Environmental Law, 7
SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 76, 90 (2017) (describing the purpose of ISDS in the TPP).
196.
See Questionnaire on Options for a Multilateral Reform of Investment Dispute
Resolution, EUR. COMM’N: CONSULTATIONS, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/
index.cfm?consul_id=233 (last updated Nov. 17, 2018); see also Ben Stanford et al., TTIP
Negotiations in the Shadow of Human Rights and Democratic Values, 27 INT’L COMPANY &
COM. L. REV. 316, 319 (2016) (“In November 2015, following an extremely critical public
consultation into the ISDS model which is commonly used in similar but smaller-scale trade
agreements, the Commission revealed that it would instead pursue proposals for an investment
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was reaffirmed in its Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan. If one
agrees that the new court’s credibility depends at least in part on whether its
mandate is based on appropriate interpretive principles, then a principle
such as the one mentioned in the previous paragraphs could be included in
the new court’s statute. This is compatible with the EU legal order in which
the Charter of Fundamental Rights stands above trade and investment treaty
198
rules. Including the principle in the new court’s statute would mean that
states that agree to its jurisdiction would agree to be bound by it, as they
199
agree to be bound by UNCITRAL or ICSID rules.
The EU is uniquely situated to effectuate reforms of ISDS: it is a major
player; it wants to keep ISDS, but it has seen a number of recent cases
where the “ability of the [EU member] States to regulate in the public
interest” was jeopardized, including a case about Germany’s decision to
200
phase out nuclear power. The EU can count on other states, both
developed (for example, Canada) and emerging (for example, India), to
201
move this debate forward.
Naturally, while the proposed MIC offers an institutional approach to
reform ISDS, it is but one of the ways forward. Any ISDS tribunal could
adopt the approach suggested in this Article, if it found it useful in its
deliberations.

court to be included in the TTIP.”) (notes omitted). Notably, observers have criticized the
proposal for the high administrative costs it would entail. See Jonathan Klett, National Interest
vs. Foreign Investment-Protecting Parties Through ISDS, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 213,
236 (2016). It is unclear whether the high costs of proceedings, as things stand now, would in
fact be a major obstacle.
197.
See The EU-Japan Agreement Explained, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement/agreement-explained/
(last
updated Feb. 06, 2018) (“The EU is committed to integrating its new approach to investment
protection and dispute resolution – an investment court system – in all its new trade
agreements. . . . [I]ncluding an investment court system in its trade agreements will help the
EU build support for a public, international investment court with: highly qualified judges
[and] transparent working methods[.] An international investment court would replace the
current panoply of private arbitration arrangements contained in thousands of bilateral trade
deals around the world.”) (emphasis in original).
198.
See Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free Trade in
Services and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection, 2 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV.
191, 200–01 (2016) (“In the hierarchy of EU law, [trade agreements are] situated in between
EU primary law, such as the Charter and the founding Treaties, and EU secondary law, such
as EU regulations, directives and decisions. This approach is based on the principle of the
autonomy of the EU legal order vis-a vis international law, which should respect the
constitutional values . . . .”).
199.
See UNCITRAL, supra note 40, at art. 1.3(a) (stating that the arbitral rules of
UNCITRAL are binding upon the parties unless otherwise stated by the treaty).
200.
Clémentine Baldon & Adèle Azzi, The New Investment Protection Policy of the EU
in the Free-Trade Treaties (CETA, TTIP. . .): New Risks for the EU?, 2018 INT’L BUS. L.J. 3,
5.
201.
See Roberts, supra note 33, at 4, 6.
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VI. Conclusion
Eli Lilly lost the gamble it played when filing its C$500 million
202
investor-state dispute against Canada. Philip Morris similarly played and
lost against the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. Yet, the cases reviewed and
compared in this Article sounded alarm bells among intellectual property
scholars. This Article briefly reviewed both cases to explain why IP scholars
were taken aback. The Article then reviewed the mechanisms used in the
two awards to bridge normative and doctrinal gaps between intellectual
property and investment. IP stands at the confluence of public and private
law streams. Finding a better way for ISDS tribunals to factor in the broader
public interest reflected in IP legislation and jurisprudence is a challenge.
The Article, after a review of proposed models to bridge such gap in trade
law, general public law, and private law, provides guidance to ISDS
tribunals in suggesting new possible approaches and a concrete interpretive
principle to minimize conflicts between IP, the broader public interest, and
ISDS.

202.
Or did it? Eli Lilly undeniably lost the ISDS case, see The Canada Award, supra
note 4, ¶¶ 469–71, but then in a strange twist, the Supreme Court of Canada, having read the
Eli Lilly v. Canada ISDS award, threw the promise doctrine out of Canadian patent law in
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2017 SCC 36, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943 (Can.). The Eli
Lilly v. Canada ISDS case is acknowledged in the Canadian Supreme Court opinion’s first
footnote.

